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100 WORD TEASER: 
 
Under the Constitution, Congress drives the federal 
lawmaking process.  Yet every year our best new lawyers focus 
their competitive energies not on jobs with the nation’s legislature 
but rather on judicial clerkships and other prestigious 
apprenticeships with executive agencies, law firms, and academe.   
 
Congress should be concerned.  But it needs to understand 
that this demand deficit has grown from a supply problem.  Unlike 
the courts, agencies, firms, and academe, Congress lacks an 
apprenticeship program to capture the interest, harness the 
abilities, and shape the minds of the law’s young elite.  Legislation 
passed by the House is a terrific starting point for a successful 
congressional clerkship program.   
 
 
                                                 
1 2008-9 International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations.  J.D., Yale; B.A., St. 
Olaf College.  For pitching in at various points to help compile and check the data, I 
heartily thank Emma Andersson, Sumon Dantiki, Justin Weinstein-Tull, Lindsay Gode, 
Stephanie Hayden, and James Cailao.  None worked on all parts of the data set, so each 
can reasonably disclaim association with any error herein, responsibility for which rests 
with me alone.  Many teachers and colleagues have generously shared their thoughts 
on this proposal and article, and I sincerely thank each.  Special appreciation goes to 
Dean Harold Hongju Koh, Chief Judge James B. Loken, William N. Eskridge, Sylvia 
Law, Jeffrey Kaliel, Christopher Mandernach, and Stephen Ruckman.    
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For the first time in the legal literature,2 I here set out the full case 
for a congressional clerkship program analogous to that of the judiciary.  
After explaining Congress’s current comparative inaccessibility, and 
identifying several benefits of such a program, I argue that it would be a 
good first step toward redressing the dramatic dearth of legislative 
experience among the profession’s elite demonstrated by my new 
empirical analysis.  I conclude by explaining what Congress needs to do 
to make successful over the long run the pilot program that would be 




Two years ago, Robin West3 was right to call for a congressional 
companion to the judiciary’s clerkship program, through which young 
lawyers spend an intensive year helping judges draft opinions.  But West 
was wrong to imply that Congress does not seek out qualified assistants.  
Members and committees do complex legal work and are keenly 
interested in the best and brightest.  Every year Congress hires hundreds 
of able young people, many of whom have J.D.s, as legislative assistants 
(LAs), counsels, and committee professional staff members (PSMs) – the 
influential staffers without whom Congress could not write the law.4  
 
                                                 
2 The only discussions in the legal literature are Robin West’s (unheeded) call in late 
2006 for such a program (Robin West, A Response to Goodwin Liu, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET 
PART 157, 161-162 (2006), available at 
http://thepocketpart.org/2006/11/21/west.html), and two passing references in 
unrelated works.  See AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 216-217 (2005) 
(“top students graduating from elite law schools are far more apt to apprentice by 
clerking for a federal judge than by interning for a representative or senator”); and 
Andrew P. Morriss, The Market for Legal Education & Freedom of Association: Why the 
“Solomon Amendment” is Constitutional and Law Schools Are Not Expressive 
Associations, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 415, 448 n.154 (2005).   
 
3 West, supra note 2. 
 
4 Of course, Congress already has a number of professionals in its employ called clerks.  
In some cases the chief of staff or office manager for a committee or subcommittee is 
designated the clerk.  The Clerk of the House, an office dating to 1789, superintends a 
variety of administrative functions including coordinating the flow of legislative paper; 
see http://clerk.house.gov/about/duties.html.  The Clerk of the House’s counterpart 
since the First Congress has been the Secretary of the Senate, to whom reports the 
Senate parliamentarian, bill clerk, legislative clerk, enrolling clerk, journal clerk, and 
executive clerk; see 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/secretary_senate.htm
#4.   However, none of these clerks are law clerks as lawyers today generally 
understand the position: an assistant lawyer, usually in apprenticeship, who researches 
the law.  Designating the new congressional staff members I propose “Congressional 
Law Clerks” or “Legislative Law Clerks” should minimize confusion. 
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Rather, where Congress has erred is in not understanding that the 
“law clerk market”5 – the labor pool of the nation’s top law graduates – is 
composed of the profession’s future leaders.  They will staff the courts 
that interpret, the agencies that implement, the firms that practice, and 
the law schools that teach the law Congress writes.  In contrast, each of 
these other dominant market players recognizes that top law graduates 
are very able and that their first jobs after law school shape their view of 
the law.  Accordingly, each has an apprenticeship program: federal 
judges hire two to four clerks each through a unified law clerk hiring 
plan; executive branch agencies have “Honors” programs and recruit at 
top law schools; law firms have analogous junior associate programs and 
platinum-plated recruiting efforts; and, law schools annually hire junior 
faculty and fellows. 
 
 To get a sense of Congress’s comparatively ad hoc, idiosyncratic 
hiring system, consider my own experience.  For nearly nine years before 
law school I did legislative work for the Senate, nearly all of it as a PSM 
for the Budget Committee and an LA for a senior Senator.  I did the same 
statutory analysis and drafting done by my J.D.-equipped colleagues, 
and landed my first job through the same process that frustrates most 
young lawyers who want to work for Congress.  
 
 As is usual in Capitol Hill hiring, it took more than good grades to 
get in the door.  Before I ever inked my cover letter, I had already met the 
Senator during a campaign and impressed people he knew personally.  I 
knew about the opening thanks to a half year of hunting, was in the 
market at the precise moment the position became available, and could 
start immediately.  I was also willing to accept compensation at a level 
common for the Hill but barely sustainable for someone servicing both 
undergraduate and law school loans.  Finally, I was willing to take a less 
substantive position – legislative correspondent – before becoming an LA. 
 
 These circumstances do not always pertain but they are not 
atypical.  And what meant opportunity for me means relative 
inaccessibility for most young lawyers compared to the alternatives.   
 
                                                 
5 The law clerk market has been analyzed in a series of articles.  See, e.g., Edward R. 
Becker, Stephen G. Breyer, & Guido Calabresi, The Federal Judicial Law Clerk Hiring 
Problem and the Modest March 1 Solution, 104 YALE L.J. 207 (1994); Louis F. Oberdorfer 
& Michael N. Levy, On Clerkship Selection: A Reply to the Bad Apple, 101 YALE L.J. 1097 
(1992); Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE L.J. 1707 (1991), and 
Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REV. 152 (1990).  More recently, 
Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard Posner, and Alvin E. Roth have written two 
influential articles on the federal judicial law clerk market: The New Market for Federal 
Judicial Law Clerks, 74 CHI. L. REV. 447 (2007), and The Market for Federal Judicial Law 
Clerks, 68 CHI. L. REV. 793 (2001). 
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Even in the rare instances where top third year law students and 
graduates are aware of the immediate openings cryptically described in 
congressional employment bulletins, they weigh them against judicial, 
agency, firm, and academic opportunities for which personally knowing 
your employer or people they know is the exception; interviews are 
conducted every fall; offers are made 9-12 months in advance of the start 
date; and young lawyers are paid sufficiently to service student debt.  
Furthermore, court clerks, agency Honors lawyers, junior associates, and 
assistant professors do substantive legal work from day one.  In contrast, 
policy, press, or constituent services duties6 dominate the days of many 
legislative staffers.  As an alternative some seek Hill internships, but 
these are rarely substantive and are usually over in three months time -- 





 The net effect of the Hill’s short-notice ad hoc hiring, the existence 
of more accessible alternatives, and the shortcomings of internships is 
that the nation’s best new lawyers are not getting firsthand legislative 
experience.  Nor do they necessarily get it secondhand in law schools, all 
of which focus their curricula on caselaw and only a few of which require 
a course in legislation.  Despite the U.S. Code’s central place in federal 
law and the fact that statutory interpretation is the bread and butter of 
federal legal practice (indeed, it has made up more than half of the 
Supreme Court’s docket in recent years),7 it is typical for new lawyers to 
analyze statutes without ever having spent a day helping write one.  That 
is unfortunate because statutory interpretation can be extremely 
challenging, owing to the complicated legislative history generated by the 
byzantine legislative process.8    
  
                                                 
6 To be clear: such work is vitally important to the representation Members provide to 
the people.  Strictly speaking it is not, however, legal work, which is what should be the 
focus of congressional clerkships for new lawyers who intend to spend their careers in 
the law. 
 
7 And this when the pace of enactment of public laws has declined under Democratic 
and Republican congresses alike.  See Elizabeth Williamson, As U.S. Economic Problems 
Loom, House, Senate Sweat the Small Stuff, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2008; and Linda 
Greenhouse, Dwindling Docket Mystifies Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006. 
 





 Congress is losing out, too.  Although it has many extremely able, 
experienced, and knowledgeable assistants,9 the comparatively low pay 
and unpredictable hiring schedule mean that most legislative staffs 
(especially in Member offices) are composed primarily of young people 
without legal training.  To be sure, many staffers with undergraduate 
educations do terrific legislative work (I hope I did).  But having gotten a 
legal education after Senate staff service, I know I would have benefited 
from the deeper understanding a J.D. would have provided of the 
constitutional context of Congress’s work.   
 
Even where expert Members and staff are involved, severe time 
pressures and varied responsibilities mean that too often basic legislative 
work gets short shrift.  During my years on the Hill, I often saw 
amendments filed that were decidedly unclear about what precisely was 
being amended or the net effect of the new law.  A law clerk or two at key 
committees and Member offices dedicated to legislative research, 
analysis, and drafting – a keeper of the U.S. Code, if you will – would be 
valuable indeed.10 
 
 Both of these points – the practical benefits of a congressional 
clerkship program to young lawyers, and to congressional offices – were 
mentioned in a 2005 letter to Congress organized by Stanford Law Dean 
Larry Kramer and signed by the deans of many of the nation’s top law 
schools.11  But the central point of the deans letter was even more 
interesting.  The program “could, over time, help counterbalance the 
profession’s current court-centered focus,” an orientation they argued 
has grown in part from the influence of court clerkships on the young 
lawyers who over the course of their careers exert profound influence on 
the law and public perception of our government. 
 
 Whether the deans are right about court centrism is beyond the 
scope of this article.  But there is no question that the profession 
                                                 
9 Like writing good briefs or judicial opinions, “[t]he drafting of statutes is an art that 
requires great skill, knowledge, and experience.”  See 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.bysec/sourceofleg.html. 
 
10 This role is performed in substantial part by the Legislative Counsel offices of the 
Senate and House, which are staffed by attorneys who assist Hill offices with legislative 
drafting.  The problems I discuss persist despite their valiant efforts.  Congressional law 
clerks would supplement rather than duplicate their efforts, and the Legislative Counsel 
offices could provided a central focus in each house for guidance and mentorship of law 
clerks working for Members, committees, and the Counsel offices.   
   
11 Dean Larry Kramer, et al., Letter to Sen. Arlen Spector and Rep. James 
Sensenbrenner, Chairmen, Senate and House Judiciary Committees, [DATE] (on file 
with author).  
 
DISCUSSION DRAFT 6
attaches far greater emphasis to litigation than legislation as a solution 
for problems of law and policy and a practice activity.  Court clerkships 
probably have something to do with that, but so do the firms, for which 
multi-year litigations make more money than multi-amendment public 
law improvement efforts.  At law schools, clinics doing litigation 
overshadow those doing legislation, while in courses on legislation 
statutory problems are reflexively analyzed from the perspective of judges 
or courtroom counsel.  For its part, the executive branch reserves its 
most prestigious legal gigs for Supreme Court litigators in the Office of 
the Solicitor General.   
 
Members of Congress have repeatedly complained of litigiousness, 
“judicial activism,” and other ills of the legal profession.  The deans 
therefore had good reason to think that Congress would respond to their 
2005 letter by creating a clerkship program and becoming more 
influential on how the legal profession understands the lawmaking 
process that produces the law the profession practices.  Three years on, 




Admittedly, these have been busy years.  But it is also likely that 
Congress, like the legal establishment itself, is unaware of just how few 
leading lawyers have ever worked for legislative bodies.  As my empirical 
analysis demonstrates, far more common among the legal elite is 
employment experience in the nation’s other key legal institutions.    
 
 As reasonably representative samples of the profession’s elite, I 
selected for analysis the biographies of federal appellate jurists (U.S. 
Supreme Court justices and circuit court judges) and professors at the 
nation’s Top 20 law schools as ranked by U.S. News & World Report.12  
Our nation’s top jurists and professors are among the profession’s most 
influential members, have discrete and publicly known memberships, 
have enough members (2,200 people plus) to be statistically significant, 
and have cirricula vitae that are relatively standardized and readily 
accessible via the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary and the websites of 
law schools.  As explained more fully in Attachment A (Methodology), the 
dataset summarized in Tables 1 and 2 was created by reading each 
biography and identifying prior employment of more than three months 
in five types of institutions: private practice, academe, legislatures, 
executive agencies, and judiciaries.  To allow comparison across all five 
institutional categories of the backgrounds of individuals presently in 
different institutions, I recorded prior professional experience and did not 




record an individual’s current primary institution of employment.  
Finally, because an institution’s essential function is similar at any level 
of government, I made no distinction among experience at the 
international, federal, state, or local levels.    
 
 The comparative lack of legislative employment experience among 
the legal profession’s leaders is profound.  Fourteen percent of federal 
appellate jurists have served in a legislature as a member or an 
employee.  In contrast, nine in ten jurists have private practice 
experience, eight in ten judicial, seven in ten executive, and just under 
half have academic experience. 
 
 Legislative experience is even rarer among top law faculties.  Just 
four percent of Top 20 law school professors -- 72 out of 1,988 -- have 
worked for a legislative body.  In contrast, over half have prior private 
practice or academic experience.  Executive and judicial experience is 
less than half as common in academe as on the appellate bench, but is 
still roughly seven and ten times more common, respectively, than 
legislative experience. 
 
There are several possible explanations for the wide gap between 
legislative and other kinds of experience among top jurists and 
academics.  The most obvious is the most doubtful: lack of interest in 
judgeships or academe among lawyers with legislative backgrounds.  A 
better theory is relative lack of interest in gaining legislative experience 
among those who aspire to the appellate bench and the ivory tower.  That 
self-selection explanation could flow in part from employer-selection bias: 
lack of recognition of the value of legislative experience among legal 
employers. 
 
To whatever extent these demand-side explanations pertain, I 
argue that they derive significantly from the supply-side problem I 
describe above.  For top young lawyers, Congress is comparatively 
inaccessible because it lacks a clerkship program.  Without a ready 
supply of legislative experience, young lawyers tend not to compete for it 
and employers prioritize other qualifications.  Over time, these supply-
based demand patterns operate to sort into the profession’s elite circles 
those who do not have legislative experience.  Not recognizing its value, 
leading lawyers in turn have not encouraged its acquisition by the next 




 Congress created the judicial clerkship program and there are 
encouraging signs that Congress will create a pilot program for itself 
starting next year.  On September 9, 2008, the House passed H.R. 
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6475,13 a bill introduced by Reps. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) and Dan Lungren 
(R-CA) that would create six year-long paid clerk positions each in the 
Senate and House, divided equally between majority and minority 
offices.14  The bill leaves design of the program to the Senate and House 
Committees on Rules and Administration.  For the program to thrive and 
become competitive over the long run with court clerkships and other 
apprenticeship alternatives, Congress should expand the pilot program 
and develop it with the following five elements in mind.    
 
• (1)  Legal Substance.  To compete in the law clerk market, 
Congress must guarantee a year of intensive work on bills, 
hearings, or chamber procedure.       
 
• (2)  Sufficient Supply.  There will not be enough positions to 
generate sustained interest if the program is limited to only a 
dozen positions.  It also should not be focused mainly on the 
Judiciary Committees.  All committees, Member offices, Legislative 
Counsel, the parliamentarians, and other Hill offices do legislative 
work.   
 
• (3)  Competitive Schedule.  Today, new lawyers put judges, firms, 
agencies, and academe ahead of Congress in part because they 
hire ahead of Congress.  Congress should hire on the same fall 
schedule, interviewing a year in advance of start dates. 
 
• (4)  Comparable Compensation.  Chief Justice Roberts has 
warned that federal judges make “about the same as (and in some 
cases less than) first-year lawyers” at top firms.15  Members of 
Congress earn the same.16  Congress cannot match top firm wages 
                                                 
13 See http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc110/h6475_ih.xml (bill text); 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_reports&docid=f:hr831.110.pdf (text of H. Rpt. 110-
831, Sept. 8, 2008, House Committee on Administration). 
 
14 Additionally, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
has created in his office a term-length clerkship for law students, which looks to be an 
exception to the rule that Hill internships have little legal substance. See 
http://leahy.senate.gov/office/lawclerk.html. 
  
15 John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, 2007 Year-End Report 
on the Federal Judiciary, Jan. 1, 2008, at 7, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/newsroom/2007yearendreport.pdf (emphasis original).   
 
16 Robert Barnes, Chief Justice Argues for ‘Vital Legislation’ to Raise Pay for Federal 




but it can pay clerks as much as does the judiciary, about $60,000 
per year. 
  
• (5)  Partnership.  On the demand side, to jumpstart interest 
Congress should partner with the law school deans in urging 
judges, agencies, firms, and academe to seek applicants with 
legislative experience.   
 
H.R. 6475 helpfully provides that clerks in its pilot program would 
compensated at the level of district court clerks.  The bill also states that 
the rules and administration committees will select the clerks, who 
would then interview with interested offices.  A two-step approach is a 
familiar one, commonly used by Hill offices that hire fellows from the 
military, the American Political Science Association, and other 
organizations.  To prevent allegations of patronage, however, the 
Committees should appoint a non-partisan panel to do the initial 
selection of clerks and provide advice as the program is administered and 




 As a former staffer I assure you that writing Congress really does 
work.  I have prepared here a one-page outline17 of the case for 
congressional clerkships and prerequisites for the program’s long-term 
success, which you could enclose with or modify into a letter or email to 
your Senator18 or Representative.19  You can also urge your legal 
employer to be supportive. 
   
As legislation goes, a clerkship program is a small step.  But this 
small step today could make a big difference tomorrow in the profession’s 
understanding of the U.S. Code it writes and which we, as lawyers, 
practice. 
                                                 
17 [Attachment B] 
 
18 See http://www.senate.gov. 
 
19 See http://www.house.gov. 
